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MATHEMATICIANS
theory which they

are in possession of several bodies of

call

geometries.

a mathematical science in general)

A

geometry (and, indeed,

a set of propositions stated in

is

terms of symbols some of which are defined in terms of others,
but some of which are necessarily undefined.
propositions

(those called theorems)

The majority

of the

are logical consequences of

other propositions, but some of the propositions are necessarily un-

proved.

The

latter are called

unproved propositions.

In

axioms or postulates

its

or,

more

plainly,

mathematical aspect, a geometry

rather completely characterized by

its

undefined symbols and

is

its

unproved propositions since all other features of the science are
derived from these by the two processes of definition and deduction.
Geometries might have, but actually have not, been created in
an accidental or artificial manner. The symbols (in particular the
undefined symbols) of geometry stand for the words that we use
in describing that complex of sensations, perceptions, etc., called
space, and its propositions are statements which one makes (or may
make if learned enough) about space. Thus there are two questions which may be asked about a geometrical proposition: (i) Is
it an axiom or a consequence of the axioms of a certain geometry?
(2) Is it true of space? The first of these questions is strictly mathematical.

The second belongs perhaps

to mathematics,

natural science, but probably to philosophy.

perhaps to

The two

questions

were formerly jumbled into one and it is only in recent years that
the mathematicians have fully separated them.
For a long time, there existed only one geometry, that of Euclid,
and this geometry because of its uniqueness occupied a post of peculiar sanctity. Its propositions were not only held to be true of space,
*EucUd's Parallel Postulate Its Nature, Validity, and Place in GeometSystems. By John William Withers, Ph. D. Chicago, The Open Court
:

rical

Publishing Co.

1905.

Euclid's parallel postulate.
but they were supposed by
of thought.

many

(e. g.

Kant)

753

to be necessary laws

In the last century, however, there appeared on the

many, geometries which contained propofrom those of Euclid. These geometries are in the
first place so logically consistent that if one of them contains a selfcontradiction, so does Euclid, and in the second place certain of them,
notably those of Lobatchewsky and Riemann, have claims to truth
scene

one, and then

first

sitions different

that rival those of Euclid.

The

philosophical importance of a theory which, on the face

of the returns, seems to destroy Kant's
synthetic

judgment

will hardly

main example of an a priori
But on account of

be questioned.

the difficulty of the technical language of the philosophers for the

mathematicians and vice versa, the subject has not yet had an adequate discussion.

Mr. Withers

one of the

is

philosopher and yet

His book, which

is

is

first

who comes

a Yale Doctor's Thesis, begins with a history of

the mathematical researches that

is

probably clearer than any avail-

able to non-mathematicians in English.
plete

to the subject as a

necessary mathematics.

in possession of the

It

does not contain a com-

account of the corresponding philosophical discussions

many

omission which probably makes for clearness since

—an

of the

discussions were beclouded by misunderstandings between the math-

ematicians and philosophers.

The

historical introduction

which, waiving for a

moment

is

followed by a couple of chapters

the notion that no thought

is

possible

which does not presuppose a Euclidean space, discuss the claims of
the geometries of Euclid, Lobatchewsky, and Riemann to validity
Mr. Withers reaches
as exponents of our geometrical experience.
the conclusion, familiar to mathematicians, that

ent decide

;

that a decision against Euclid

solutely in his favor probably

is

not.

is

we cannot

possible

;

at pres-

that one ab-

In the discussion leading to

by some remarks on the empirical origin and the psychology of certain conceptions like that of direction he successfully
this result,

disposes of several of the usual errors.

On

the other hand, a mathematician

is

pretty sure to feel the

need of a few more "ifs" and "buts." For example, on pages 106107 where the author very clearly exposes the "shortest distance"
fallacy,

he ought also to note that distance can be defined analytically

so as to avoid the difficulty.
will assert that

directly that a

Without

citing further instances

we

throughout the book there are statements uttered

mathematician would prefer

not deny, however, that

to see qualified.

We

for the purpose of conveying the

will

right
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emphasis the methods of Mr. Withers may be better than the attempt
at Hteral accuracy of a mathematician.
There are places where Mr. Withers seems to overlook tempoFor example, he regards
rarily the nature of an abstract science.
it

as a difficulty (page 112) that Fieri should use undefined symbols

and unproved propositions which involve metrical ideas in making
a definition of metrical terms; and of Riemann he says (pp. 112,
"In other words by assuming metrical properties in his ds
113)
and then proceeding to determine these properties upon the basis
of this assumption, he easily draws out at the faucet what he has
already poured in at the bung." But this is what we always do in
mathematics. In geometry no more than elsewhere do we expect
to get something for nothing. The axioms of a science must necesWe never expect to generate
sarily involve the whole structure.
anything by a logical process. By mathematical language we can
never tell the meaning, say of a straight line, (cf. Chap. IV), in
:

any other sense than that we utter a set of propositions, logically
related and including the statements that can be made about straight
lines.

seems that by being more explicit in his statements about
Mr. Withers might have considerably
abbreviated and improved his statements about curvature of space
and the necessity or lack of necessity of assuming a Euclidean
It

abstract science in general,

space of higher dimensions in order to realize a space of constant
positive or negative curvature.

Presumably for a

like reason, the

work on pages 107-108 seems to confuse two
in one of which "distance" was the undefined symother of which the notion of "betweenness" was

discussion of Peano's

separate studies
bol

and

in

the

fundamental.*

After having shown that Euclid's geometry cannot be proved
Mr. Withers decides in the last

true by any appeal to experience,

is no way of accomplishing this result by an
have remarked above on the details of this
argument and here raise only one further question perhaps without

two chapters that there
a priori method.

We

—

putting

There

it

is

our

(cf.

from

its

in a clear-cut

form.

a technical usage
first

How

shall

we

use the word exist?

which says that a mathematical science
if no two propositions deducible

paragraphs) exists

hypotheses are in contradiction.

In this sense

(due to

*We

note in passing that the second footnote reference on page 108 is
that in the bibliography under the single head, Moore, appear
two men, one an American and the other an EngHshman that on
page 96, line 7, the word "of" should be deleted; that on page 142, "motion'
is printed for "notion."
incorrect;
works of

;
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we

Hilbert)

are able to say that

arithmetic exists

—

i.

e.,

all
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mathematical sciences exist

if

the science of the positive whole numbers.

.etc.
tempted to say that surely the whole numbers, i, 2, 3.
But what would be the content of such a statement? and do
we know these numbers except by the propositions which we wish
to prove consistent?
A more difficult form of the same question would be to ask
nor is it
what Mr. Withers means by such language as this "

One

is

.

.

exist.

:

.

.

.

.

maintained that a merely formal world could really exist or be truly
known if it did exist" (page 147). Or the following from pages
160-161

:

"We

cannot

in

any a priori fashion dogmatically deny the
more than our two-

existence of a four-dimensional space-world any

dimensional beings could deny that our world exists."

Altogether

Mr. Withers' last chapter is obscured by the lack
of a satisfactory meaning for the word "exist."
We have taken pains to warn the reader not to accept all the
statements of Mr. Withers as representing a mathematical point of
view with strict accuracy because we believe that the book, on account of its general clearness, ought to have a wide circle of readers.
It might well be read as an introduction to the large work of Russell
on the Principles of Mathematics.
the discussion in

